On Dual Power

What the Left can learn from Hamas (and Sweden)

Dual power is a concept that gets discussed a lot on the Left. Like mutual aid, it tends to be favored by anarchists, and it's usually held up as an alternative to statist strategies favored by socialists, who are mostly disdainful of it.

In my view, both groups get it wrong, and in doing so, fail to properly use a potent strategy for building power.

So, what is "dual power"? The term originated with Lenin, who used it to describe the tension between the Soviets ("workers' councils") and the weak Russian Provisional Government following the February Revolution. Lenin argued that dual power would allow for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and its replacement with a union of Soviets. This entailed the expansion and defense of alternative and counter institutions that would undermine and replace the governing capacity of the officially recognized state, eventually leading to its full replacement with the insurgent power. He believed this was possible due to the Provisional Government's lack of popular legitimacy and the rising credibility of the Soviets. It is important to note that Lenin used dual power to describe a set of circumstances; it was not so much a strategy as a situational opportunity.

The Bolsheviks did, of course, emerge victorious against the Provisional Government in the October Revolution, but the extent to which that victory validated Lenin's dual power analysis is very much a subject for debate. Suffice to say, there were a lot of variables at play in the Soviet victory, many that Lenin had not anticipated.

In the last few decades, however, "dual power" has come to describe a strategy rather than a set of circumstances. Anarchists, who sometimes refer to it as "counterpower," have adopted the tactical prescriptions made by Lenin during the dual power arrangement—building and defending alternative and counter institutions, such as 'mutual aid' groups, worker coops, and popular councils—as a strategic framework for undermining the state. While the way this strategy might lead to a final victory over the state is hazy, the general idea is that parallel institutions will eventually make the state irrelevant, causing it to whither away.

The primary purpose of this strategy is to avoid direct conflict with the state and capital. This has made dual power—or "alternative institution building," as it's called in crunchier circles—popular with people who are put-off or pessimistic about confrontational politics.

The big problem with this is that no one can win without confrontation. The moment an alternative institution actually threatens those in power, a confrontation will ensue, almost assuredly resulting in the destruction of the alternative institution. If the alternative institution never threatens those in power, then it simply dies out due to some combination of burn-out, irrelevance, or internal drama.

A good example of this is the 1980s squatting movement. Large swaths of urban real estate in North America and Europe became squats, serving as housing and community centers for many thousands of people. This was made possible by capital's flight from those geographic spaces and the state's indifference to people living in abandoned apartment buildings. But as soon as that real estate became desirable again, the state evicted virtually all of the squats, who were incapable of defending their spaces despite large-scale mobilizations.

What they lacked was state power. Had they organized to put people supportive of their cause in positions of state power, they would have vastly improved their odds of surviving the inevitable conflict with capital. Instead, the reins of state violence were held exclusively by their opponents, sealing their fate from the beginning. The squatters' distaste for electoralism proved their undoing.

However, squats were hugely popular and the very fact that they were able to rally large-scale mobilizations in their defense is proof of that. They served a real function, and allowed many people—for a time—to lead far better, more meaningful lives. Alternative and counter institutions are vital and popular, but we must learn from their failures in order to make them a useful part of today's struggle for a better future.

By now, my prescription is probably clear: dual power as a strategy can, in fact, be successful, but it must be coupled with a viable effort to gain state power. The two work synergistically: dual power lends credibility to efforts to gain state power by providing proof of concept. It is far easier for people to support a radical agenda when they can see it in action, even if on a much smaller scale than ultimately proposed. Alternative and counter institutions can also materially improve people's lives right away—especially in areas underserved by the state and capital—which is one of the best ways to build support for any political project.

In this manner, an electoral strategy (where appropriate) is boosted by a dual power strategy, and a dual power strategy is made viable by a successful electoral strategy, which can not only blunt attacks on alternative institutions but also expand them with state resources.

The ultimate victory of this strategy occurs via the merger of the dual power project and the state. This transforms the character of the state, turning it from an instrument of the old regime into an instrument of the insurgent movement. It is important to note that this transformation can be either reformist or revolutionary in nature.

Perhaps the best example of a successfully deployed reformist dual power strategy is Swedish social democracy:

"[The Swedish social democratic movement] encompassed a number of other organizations, even if the ties were not always formalized. In addition to the [trade union confederation], the most important one, these included the Workers’ Educational Association, which organized thousands of study circles and lectures; a number of public high schools; and more than a thousand People’s Houses and several hundred People’s Parks around the country. Without doubt, organizations such as the Swedish National Pensioners’ Organization and the Swedish Union of Tenants could also be called members of the movement. Furthermore, an extensive co-operative movement collaborated closely with social democracy, with its own wide-ranging set of operations, including the insurance company Folksam, the co-operative housing society HSB, a motion-picture company, advertising firms, and even a national chain of undertakers."

These alternative institutions eventually merged with the state after the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Sweden was elected to power in 1932, forming the basis for what would become one of the world's most enduring welfare states.

Perhaps the most successful example of revolutionary dual power can be found in Gaza, of all places. Hamas echos the structure of many left wing national liberation movements by utilizing a three part structure: social services, political/religious training, and military operations. A local council structure which elects representative to a coordinating council governs the three wings, although the balance of power has shifted back and forth between the political and military wings over time.

What has not changed is the central importance of social services, on which it is estimated Hamas spends 95% of its budget. Just some of the services they provide: charitable societies, hospitals, pharmacies, schools (both religious & secular), sporting clubs, retirement homes, tithing committees, computing centers, libraries, scholarships, legal aid, summer camps, recreation facilities, martyr funds for the support of families/heirs, and food banks/kitchens.

Palestinians are not required to be members of Hamas to use those services, although special benefits are reserved for members and the families of martyrs. Hamas' social service wing is so extensive that even their political opponents make humanitarian donations via Hamas (also because they are trusted not to embezzle, unlike Fatah.)

What was the result of all that alternative institution building? Hamas was elected to power with 44.45% of the vote in 2006, despite the fact that only 18% of Palestinians support their political vision. Dual power gave them such a strong reputation for "walking the talk" that they were able to overcome low support for their politics and extreme foreign pressure. It's not hard to see the lesson in that.

So, how can dual power be successfully deployed in the United States today? The neoliberal austerity regime has left no shortage of opportunities for alternative and counter institutions to fill the gaps left by the state, and capital continues to chase exponential returns on worthless scams rather than providing for many basic human needs. Those gaps, along with the social alienation inherent to capitalism, are the lowest hanging fruit for a dual power approach.

Groups like the Democratic Socialists of America (of which I am a member), who are pursuing a successful electoral strategy, should go after that low-hanging fruit in conjunction with their electoral efforts. Social services like those offered by Sweden's social democrats are well-suited to the precarious young workers who make up the left wing voting base in places like New York City. Direct service provisioning like the kind done by Hamas is worth the time and energy anywhere there are people in need.

When directly and visibly coupled with an electoral effort, such initiatives can build popular support beyond ideological lanes and set the stage for gaining more power than would be otherwise possible.

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